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Mainstream cognitive neuroscience has begun to accept the idea of embodied mind,
which assumes that the human mind is fundamentally constituted by the dynamical
interactions of the brain, body, and the environment. In today’s paradigm of naturalistic
neurosciences, subjects are exposed to rich contexts, such as video sequences or
entire films, under relatively controlled conditions, against which researchers can interpret
changes in neural responses within a time window. However, from the point of view
of radical embodied cognitive neuroscience, the increasing complexity alone will not
suffice as the explanatory apparatus for dynamical embodiment and situatedness of the
mind. We suggest that narrative enactive systems with dynamically adaptive content as
stimuli, may serve better to account for the embodied mind engaged with the surrounding
world. Among the ensuing challenges for neuroimaging studies is how to interpret
brain data against broad temporal contexts of previous experiences that condition the
unfolding experience of nowness. We propose means to tackle this issue, as well as
ways to limit the exponentially growing combinatoria of narrative paths to a controllable
number.
Keywords: enactive systems, neuroimaging, narrative nowness, radical embodiment, naturalistic neuroscience,
time experience, context dependency
INTRODUCTION
The embodied mind view assumes that the phenomenon of
human mind is fundamentally constituted by the dynamical inter-
actions of the brain, body, and its environment (Merleau-Ponty,
1962; Varela et al., 1991; Clark, 1997; Chemero, 2009; Barrett,
2011). In this article, we first lay out the path we see leading
from conventional to naturalistic neuroscience. Then we discuss
what we envision as the next steps on the way toward radically
embodied cognitive neuroscience.
CONVENTIONAL TO NATURALISTIC NEUROSCIENCES
Cognitive neurosciences following the conventional experimen-
tal paradigms of psychology and psychophysiology have typi-
cally departed from simple stimuli that are isolated from bodily
and situational contexts. The underlying epistemology is close
to that of classical empiricism, with the aim to minimize the
number of variables in order to make inductive inferences. This
approach is, by definition, unable to handle complex systems
of contexts as explanations of observations. Unlike in psychol-
ogy, where the requirement of ecological validity has been long
since recognized (Brunswik, 1955), the limits of computational
capabilities have heavily constrained the possibilities of ecolog-
ically valid neuroscience. Recently, however, the advanced tech-
nological developments have allowed the adoption of a more
naturalistic approach. The increasing use of stimuli, whose rich-
ness of characteristics and contextual embeddings assumedly
corresponds to natural settings, marks a major methodological
revision in neuroscience (see e.g., Hari and Kujala, 2009; Zaki
and Ochsner, 2009; Maguire, 2012). Instead of experimental
designs with isolated stimuli, the paradigm of naturalistic neu-
rosciences is focused on the human cognition as it is engaged
in more ecologically valid settings of longer durations, with the
purpose to gain access to the brain processes that unfold in
time.
So far, the method of free film viewing in the fMRI scanner
has allowed observing human brain functions in relation to con-
texts reminiscent to “real-life” situations (Bartels and Zeki, 2004;
Hasson et al., 2004; Malinen et al., 2007). The interpretation of the
brain responses to film stimuli is typically based on annotation of
the features and content factors of interest in the film at particular
time points (Lahnakoski et al., 2012). The advantages of free film
viewing are many. Films are, on one hand, highly controllable
and can be repeated identically to a large number of people,
and, on the other, often tell stories embedded in contexts of
everyday experience. The use of naturalistic narrative stimuli in
fMRI has already accumulated, for instance, the knowledge on
the multiplicity of temporal hierarchies in the brain that may
range from milliseconds to tens of seconds (Hasson et al., 2008;
Kauppi et al., 2010). These findings allow relating neural behavior
in different time scales to temporally extended contextual (or
situational) factors, such as narrative comprehension, unfolding
in time (Lerner et al., 2011). Further, the naturalistic settings
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allow studying intersubjectively shared aspects of cognition, such
as contextual framing effects on social attributions (Mobbs et al.,
2006), or emotional contagion (Nummenmaa et al., 2012), that
reveal dependency of experience on contexts and perspectives in
social settings.
While movies have turned out to serve the purposes of nat-
uralistic neuroscience to some point, they have major short-
comings with respect to radical embodiment. First, though
resembling real-life situations, stimulus movies are typically
not interactive, and thus not dynamic in the strict ecologi-
cal sense. Therefore they cannot fully capture brain responses
associated with sensorimotor and social enactment in similar
manner as they would be elicited in real-life interaction sit-
uations. Secondly, movie stimuli give only limited access to
extended temporal contexts of situations against which the cin-
ematic story is experienced at a given transient moment of
time. Brain activity is often analyzed through a narrow tem-
poral window capturing not much more than that which is
more or less immediately audiovisually present in the narra-
tive content (Figure 1), whereby the analysis runs the risk of
missing the subject’s temporally laid out engagement and expe-
riential history conditioning the experience of that which is
present.
Relevant questions related to studying human mind in socially
valid contexts include, to what extent does the brain activity
of “living-by” other people’s experiences on the screen differ
from that of direct interaction between people? As an example
from game studies, Kätsyri et al. (2013) have demonstrated the
substantial qualitative difference between playing and just watch-
ing, motivating the goal of deeper engagement in neuroimaging
FIGURE 1 | In naturalistic brain experiments with film footage as
stimuli, the observed brain activity is typically analyzed against the
narrow window of nowness that is accessible through whatever is
more or less immediately present, while ignoring the broader
temporal contexts, for instance, the experiential history or
situatedness of the subject, or the contextual effects of previous
events on the comprehension of the immediate present.
studies. Currently, methods are being developed for scanning
synchronous brain activations of two people who are in direct
interaction in magnetoencephalography (MEG) with one another
via real-time video (Baess et al., 2012), as well as in direct
bodily interaction in a two-person fMRI scanner (Lee et al.,
2012). Future will show, how two-person neuroimaging will
meet the challenges of making analytical inferences of a sys-
tem consisting of two “black boxes” instead of one. Mean-
while, in our view, the methodological gap between the one-
person movie-viewing to the two-person interaction settings
could be bridged with developing dynamically adaptive stim-
ulus systems for managing socially valid interaction settings
in more controllable manner. We propose that the explana-
tory framework of enactment might provide ways for model-
ing computationally the systemic situatedness of the brain and
applying these means as dynamically adaptive stimuli. How-
ever, there is no reason to underestimate the methodical and
epistemological challenges that will be touched in the following
discussion.
ENACTIVE NEUROSCIENCE
The notion of enactive cognitive science, as proposed by Varela
et al. (1991), refers to the assumption of the mind as a brain-
body system inseparably embedded in the world in terms of
enactment, i.e., active engagement within that world, and that
“cognition is not the representation of a pregiven world by a
pregiven mind but is rather the enactment of a world and a
mind on the basis of a history of the variety of the actions
that a being in the world performs” (p. 9). In their terms,
enaction consists of two points: (1) perception as perceptually
guided action; and (2) the emergence of cognitive structures
“from the recurrent sensorimotor patterns that enable action
to be perceptually guided” (Ibid., p. 173). Applied to neuro-
science, the radical enactive approach, as it is termed, should
imply modeling the reciprocal relationship between embodied
cognitive states and the corresponding neuronal activity at the
level of large-scale emergent dynamical patterns of activity that
cut across the brain, body, and the world (Thompson and Varela,
2001).
In order to fully accommodate enactment in the world, enac-
tive stimuli should not be limited to static representations of the
world, but rather to be extended to interactive stimulus models
that are adaptive and capable of modeling the reciprocal impact
of subject’s enactions to themselves. One possible way is related
to the interactive brain hypothesis of Di Paolo and De Jaegher
(2012) that suggests self-organizing dynamics of social engage-
ment constituted by states of coordination, and transitions between
the states. While using real persons or natural(-like) situations
as stimuli may elicit “natural” brain activity, the downside is
that the stimulus may remain as another “black box”, this is,
as unpredictable and difficult to read and control as the brain.
Another is to model the dynamics of relevant socio-cultural
exchange (Kaipainen, 1994; Kitayama and Park, 2010), which,
however, involves assumptions about cultural dynamics beyond
the present focus.
In the following, we discuss the possibility of using narration-
based dynamical simulations, such that are able to reflect relevant
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aspects of the mind’s situatedness and embodiedness in a
similar manner as movies do, but which, in addition, are
interactive and dynamic while maintaining a certain level of
controllability.
NARRATIVE ENACTIVE SYSTEM
Our proposition to bridge radical embodied cognitive views
with naturalistic neuroscience draws from the concept of nar-
rative enactive systems (Tikka, 2008; Kaipainen et al., 2011). It
implies the application of dynamically generated or compos-
ited naturalistic stimuli for neuroscientific experiments (Tikka
et al., 2012) as dynamical models of the live situations, in which
the experiencer participates and acts in the framework of a
story. Rather than fixed stimulus representation, such as linear
movie footage, narrative enactive systems simulate the dynam-
ically changing flow of the environment that is adaptive to the
viewer’s bodily experience (perception and action-simulation)
of the unfolding narrative. We envision that enactive narrative
stimuli could be composited in real-time by a means of, for
example, re-combinations of audiovisual media clips from a
database (Tikka et al., 2006; Pugliese et al., 2014), algorithmi-
cally implemented animations, or game-like avatars with the
model described above. This arrangement would constitute an
enactive medium, capable of simulating life-like situations, in
which the subject is engaged as a participant rather than just an
observer.
Unlike traditional neuroscience paradigms, including the one
referred to as “naturalistic”, an enactive feedback loop is assumed
in the proposed setting. That means taking into account the
contexts constituted by experiences of the previous events, implic-
itly guiding every experience of nowness (Figure 2). We assume
that the experience of nowness is related to ongoing processes
of memory and attention, corresponding to that which Husserl
and later Varela have called retention (Husserl, 1964; Varela,
1999; Figure 2). Following their conceptualization, we take that
retention is carried along as backward-looking reflections of the
continuous process of enactment.
In order to substantiate this idea, imagine thriller film footage
that shows a bedside drawer in a hotel room. In this situation,
the mere presence of the piece of furniture on the transient
screen is not enough to account for the excitement elicited in
the viewer that has seen the movie from the beginning. It is
essential to include the retentive context of having learned about
the gun hidden there in a preceding stage of the narrative. This,
in turn, implies the anticipation of a violent event, in Husserlian
terms protention, likely to elicit certain kinds of brain responses
reflecting alertness and readiness for motor action.
The assumption of enactive media (Kaipainen et al., 2011)
implies that the experience itself (involving perceptual and action-
related neural networks) steers the narrative via some kind of
psychophysiological interface, e.g., eye tracking, electrodermal
conductivity, or real-time neurofeedback, reflecting aspects of the
holistic experience. At the same time, even the stimulus narrative
itself has its own forward-driving inertia, corresponding to how
environmental events flow independently of the observer, moti-
vating anticipations (protentions). The methodological advantage
is that both the history of such enactions (retention) as well as
FIGURE 2 | The viewer has a contextualized and situated window of
nowness to several levels of narrative, including retentive references to
earlier events and eliciting protentive expectations for the coming
events. The temporal contexts can be weighted or prioritized in a number
of ways, amounting to different interpretations (perspectives) of the
narrative. They correspond to different narrative sequences that can be
algorithmically composited.
time-coded annotations of the narrative is known. These can
be further aggregated into a time-dependent simulation of the
experiential perspective (nowness) at each particular point of
stimulus presentation, eventually providing a spectrum of cues for
interpreting corresponding brain activity beyond the mere imme-
diate stimulus. A preliminary computational model that simulates
such an evolving experiential perspective, termed nowness model,
has been introduced by Kauttonen et al. (2014). It consists of
(a) decaying memory traces of previous experiences; and (b) a
mechanism of refreshing traces via emerging associations. The
nowness model, unlike conventional stimuli of neuroimaging
studies, would be able to stand for a spectrum of contextualizing
narrative factors, such as the hidden gun (referring to the previous
example).
A practical challenge is obviously that the combinatoria of
narrative paths may well grow too broad to allow sufficient statis-
tical momentum for brain imaging studies, unless constrained to
some manageable number. Our preliminary suggestion is to limit
the variations to a controllable number of prototypical narrative
categories, such a reduction might follow, for example, studies of
viewer responses related to different film genres (Grodal, 1997;
Visch and Tan, 2009), or player-responses in interactive games
(Mathiak and Weber, 2006; Kätsyri et al., 2013).
DISCUSSION
For neurosciences, the implication of the radical embodied cogni-
tive approach is to move toward holistic and systemic study of the
brain-world-body dynamics. We propose rethinking the role of
stimuli in neuroscience: instead of static representations, should
be conceived of as continuously evolving dynamical systems that
are capable of connecting the past and future experiences and
of accounting for the mutual influences between brain-body
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and its environment. In our view, Varela’s concept of enactment
encapsulates the essence of this relation and allows ways to go
beyond today’s naturalistic neuroscience.
Obviously, the proposed approach sets significant challenges
for the methods of empirical neurosciences. However, while the
complete solution would amount to nothing less than mod-
eling the world around the brain, we believe it possible to
isolate partial, focused and controllable dynamic stimulus sys-
tems to address essential aspects of radical cognitive neuro-
science. This prerequires rich annotations that do not have
to be limited to conscious, linguistic, and semantic aspects
of the experience (e.g., researcher’s or community’s tags on
the stimulus material), but can also include psychophysiologi-
cal recordings associated with the material (psychophysiologi-
cal annotations, e.g., heart rate, eye-movements, electrodermal
conductivity), environmental conditions (e.g., light, loudness,
temperature), and references to cultural contexts (e.g., genre,
reviews, background information). Besides rich annotations, the
approach requires using the simulation of how previous embod-
ied experiences are present in the experience of newness. Bind-
ing together the past and the anticipation of future beyond
mere point-like fixed stimuli would allow a temporally situ-
ated interpretation of the corresponding observations of brain
activity.
Fully conscious of the complexity of translating the pro-
posed approach to actual laboratory work, we are confident that
the idea of stimuli that are dynamically adaptive to embodied
actions can open new avenues to radical embodied cognitive
neuroscience.
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